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Abstract
This paper introduces a causation coefficient which is defined in
terms of probabilistic causal models. This coefficient is suggested as
the natural causal analogue of the Pearson correlation coefficient and
permits comparing causation and correlation to each other in a simple,
yet rigorous manner. Together, these coefficients provide a natural
way to classify the possible correlation/causation relationships that can
occur in practice and examples of each relationship are provided. In
addition, the typical relationship between correlation and causation is
analyzed to provide insight into why correlation and causation are often
conflated. Finally, example calculations of the causation coefficient are
shown on a real data set.
Introduction
The maxim, “Correlation is not causation”, is an important warning to
analysts, but provides very little information about what causation is and how
it relates to correlation. This has prompted other attempts at summarizing
the relationship. For example, Tufte [1] suggests either, “Observed covariation
is necessary but not sufficient for causality”, which is demonstrably false
or, “Correlation is not causation but it is a hint”, which is correct, but still
underspecified. In what sense is correlation a ‘hint’ to causation?
Correlation is well understood and precisely defined. Generally speaking,
correlation is any statistical relationship involving dependence, i.e. the ran-
dom variables are not independent. More specifically, correlation can refer
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to a descriptive statistic that summarizes the nature of the dependence.
Such statistics do not provide all of the information available in the joint
probability distribution, but can provide a valuable summary that is easier
to reason about. Among the most popular, and often referred to as just “the
correlation coefficient” [2], is the Pearson correlation coefficient, which is a
measure of the linear correlation between variables.
Causality is an intuitive idea that is difficult to make precise. The key
contribution of this paper is the introduction of a “causation coefficient”,
which is suggested as the natural causal analogue of the Pearson correlation
coefficient. The causation coefficient permits comparing correlation and
causation to each other in a manner that is both rigorous and consistent
with common intuition.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows: The statistical/causal distinction
is discussed to provide background. The existing probabilistic causal model
approach to causality is briefly summarized. The causation coefficient is
defined in terms of probabilistic causal models and some of the properties of
the coefficient are discussed to support the claim that it is the natural causal
analogue of the Pearson correlation coefficient.
The definition of the causation coefficient permits the following new analyses
to be conducted: A taxonomy of the possible relationships between correlation
and causation is introduced, with example models. The typical relationship
between correlation and causation is analyzed to provide insight into why
correlation and causation are often conflated. Finally, example calculations
of the correlation coefficient are shown on a real data set.
Statistical/causal distinction
Causality is difficult to formalize. Causality is implicit in the structure of
ordinary language [3] and the words ‘causality’ and ‘causal’ are often used
to refer to a number of disparate concepts. In particular, much confusion
stems from conflating three distinct tasks in causal inference [4]:
1. Definitions of counterfactuals
2. Identification of causal models from population distributions
3. Selection of causal models given real data
Counterfactuals, as defined in philosophy, are hypothetical or potential
outcomes – statements about possible alternatives to the actual situation [5].
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A classic example is, “If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have
been a nuclear holocaust” [6], a statement which seems intuitively correct,
but difficult to formally model and impossible to empirically verify. Defining
causation in terms of counterfactuals originates with Hume in defining a
cause to be, “where, if the first object had not been, the second never
had existed” [7]. Indeed, in a world where there had been a nuclear war
during the Nixon administration, it would be quite reasonable to claim that
launching nuclear missiles was a cause. A key difficulty in making this notion
of causality precise is that it requires precise models of counterfactuals and
therefore precise assumptions that can be unobservable and untestable even
in principle.
For example, consider the possible results of treating a patient in a clinical
setting. In the notation of the Rubin causal model [8], a particular patient or
unit1, u, can be potentially exposed to either treatment, t, or control, c. The
treatment effect2, Yt(u)− Yc(u), is the difference between the outcomes when
the patient is exposed to treatment and when the same patient is exposed to
the control. Determining treatment effect on a unit is usually the ultimate
goal of causal inference. It is also impossible to observe – the same patient
cannot be treated and not treated – a problem which Holland names the
Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference.
This is not to suggest that causal inference is impossible, merely that addi-
tional assumptions must be made if causal conclusions are to be reached. A
well known assumption that makes causal inference possible is randomiza-
tion. Assuming that units are randomly assigned to treatment or control
groups, it is possible to estimate the average treatment effect, E[Yt − Yc].
Note that randomization is an assumption external to the data; it is not
possible to determine, from the data alone, that it was obtained from a
randomized controlled trial. Another example of an assumption that permits
causal inference is unit homogeneity, which can be thought of as “laboratory
conditions”. If different units are carefully prepared, it may be reasonable to
assume that they are equivalent in all relevant aspects, i.e. Yt(u1) = Yt(u2)
and Yc(u1) = Yc(u2). For example, it is often assumed that any two samples
of a given chemical element are effectively identical. In these cases, treatment
1“Units” are the basic objects (primitives) of study in an investigation in the Rubin
causal model approach. Examples of units include individual human subjects, households,
or plots of land.
2This is also referred to as “causal effect” in the literature. In this paper, “treatment
effect” is used to avoid confusion with the related but distinct definition of causal effect in
the probabilistic causal model approach.
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effect can be calculated directly as Yt(u1)− Yc(u2).
A closely related concept is ceteris paribus, roughly, “other things held
constant”, which is a mainstay of economic analysis [4]. For example,
increasing the price of some good will cause demand to fall, assuming that no
other relevant factors change at the same time. This is not to suggest that
no other factors will change in a real economy; ceteris paribus simply isolates
the effect of one particular change to make it more amenable to analysis.
In practice, the first causal inference task, defining counterfactuals, requires
having a scientific theory. For example, classical mechanics describes the
possible states of idealized physical systems and can provide an account of
manipulation. The theory can predict what would happen to the trajectory
of some object if an external force were to be applied, whether or not such a
force was actually applied in the real world. Scientific theories are usually
parameterized; one example of a parameter is standard gravity, gn ≈ 9.8
m/s2, the acceleration of an object due to gravity near the surface of the
earth [9].
The second causal inference task, identification from population distributions,
is a problem of uniquely determining a causal model or some property of a
causal model from hypothetical population data. In other words, the problem
is to find unique mappings from population distributions or other population
measures to causal parameters. This can be thought of as the problem of
determining which scientific theory is correct, given data without sampling
error. A well-designed experiment to determine g0 will, in the limit of infinite
samples, yield the exact value for the parameter.
The third task, selection of causal models given real data, is the problem of
inference in practice. Any real experiment can only provide an analyst with
a finite-sample distribution subject to random error. This problem lies in
the domain of estimation theory and hypothesis testing.
In addition to the standard population/sample distinction, this paper follows
Pearl’s conventions in referring to the statistical/causal distinction3 [10]. A
statistical concept is a concept that is definable in terms of a joint probability
distribution of observed variables. Variance is an example of a statistical
parameter; the statement that f is multivariate normal is an example of
a statistical assumption. A causal concept is a nonstatistical concept that
3This distinction has been referred to by many different names, including: descrip-
tive/etiological, descriptive/generative, associational/causal, empirical/theoretical, obser-
vational/experimental, observational/interventional.
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is definable in terms of a causal model. Randomization is an example of a
causal, not statistical, assumption because it is impossible to determine from
a joint probability distribution that a variable was randomly assigned.
This distinction draws a sharp line between statistical and causal analysis,
which can be thought of as the difference between analyzing uncertain, yet
static conditions versus changing conditions [11]. Estimating and updating
the likelihood of events based on observed evidence are statistical tasks,
given that experimental conditions remain the same. Causal analysis aims
to infer the likelihood of events under changing conditions, brought about by
external interventions such as treatments or policy changes. Much like how
statistical inference is performed with respect to assumptions formalized in
a statistical model, rigorous causal inference requires formal causal models.
Probabilistic causal models
Probabilistic causal models4 are an approach to causality characterized by
nonparametric models associated with a type of directed acyclic graph (DAG)
called a causal diagram. The concept of using graphs to model probabilistic
and causal relationships originates with Wright’s path analysis [12]. The
modern, nonparametric version appears to have been first proposed by Pearl
and Verma [13] and has been the subject of considerable research since
then [14] [15] [16]. This section is meant to provide a high-level summary
of probabilistic causal models, sufficient to explain the proposed causation
coefficient.
Causal models
The philosophy of probabilistic causal models is that of Laplacian quasi-
determinism – a complete description of the state of a system is sufficient to
exactly determine how the system will evolve [17]. In this view, randomness
is a statement of an analyst’s ignorance, not inherent to the system itself.5
A causal model, M , consists of a set of equations where each child-parent
family is represented by a deterministic function:
4Also referred to as “graphical causal models” and “structural causal models” in the
literature.
5This excludes quantum-mechanical systems from analysis. Arguably, the ‘intrinsic
randomness’ of these systems are why they are so often considered counterintuitive.
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Xi = fi(pai, i) (i = 1, . . . , n)
The Xi variables are the endogenous variables, determined by factors in
the model. pai denotes the parents of Xi, which can be thought of as the
direct, known causes of Xi. The i variables are the exogenous variables,
and can appropriately be considered ‘background’ variables or ‘error terms’
and correspond to variables that are determined by factors outside of the
model [10]. Since the exogenous variables model those factors that cannot
be directly accounted for, they are treated as random variables. Regardless
of the distribution of the exogenous variables, or the functional form of the
fi equations, a probability distribution, P () over the exogenous variables in-
duces a probability distribution, P (x1, . . . , xn) over the endogenous variables
[10]. The resulting model is called a probabilistic causal model.
Each causal model induces a causal diagram, G, where each Xi corresponds to
a vertex and each parent-child relationship between pai and Xi corresponds
to a directed edge from parent to child. In this paper, it is assumed that all
models are recursive, i.e. all models induce an acyclic causal diagram.
This paper adopts the convention that all of the exogenous variables are
mutually independent. If all of the endogenous variables are observable –
denoted in the causal diagram by solid nodes – then the model is called
Markovian. The joint probability function, P (x1, . . . , xn), in a Markovian
model is said to be Markov compatible with G in that P (x1, . . . , xn) respects
the Markov condition: each variable is independent of all its non-descendants
given its parents in the graph [18]. Dependence between two observable
variables that have no observable ancestor can be introduced by adding a
latent endogenous variable, denoted in a causal diagram by an open node.
Such a model is called semi-Markovian.
Each causal diagram can be thought of as denoting a set of causal models.
Most of this paper considers the following set of models with endogenous
variables X, Y and Z:
Z = fZ(Z)
X = fX(Z, X)
Y = fY (X,Z, Y )
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X Y
Z
(a)
X Y
Z
(b)
Figure 1: Causal diagrams for Markovian and semi-Markovian models
Causal effect
Without any additional context, this characterization of probabilistic causal
models appears merely to be a way to generate Bayesian networks. However,
the functional, quasi-deterministic approach also specifies how the probability
distribution of the observable variables change in response to an external
intervention. The simplest external intervention is where a single variable
Xi is forced to take some fixed value xi, ‘setting’ or ‘holding constant’
Xi = xi. Such an atomic intervention corresponds to replacing the equation
Xi = fi(pai, i) with the constant xi, generating a new model. This can be
extended to sets of variables.
Causal effect [14] Given two disjoint sets of variables, X and Y , the causal
effect of X on Y , denoted either as P (y | xˆ) or P (y | do(x)) is a
function from X to the space of probability distributions on Y . For
each realization x of X, P (y | xˆ) gives the probability of Y = y induced
by deleting from the model all equations corresponding to variables in
X and substituting X = x in the remaining equations.
Crucially, causal effect, P (y | xˆ), is fundamentally different than conditioning
or observation, P (y | x). The latter is a function of the joint probability
distribution of the original model, M . The former is a function of the
distribution of the submodel, Mx, that results from the effect of action
do(X = x) on M . Intuitively, this can be thought of as ‘cutting’ all of the
incoming edges to X and replacing the random variable with the constant x.
It is possible for DAGs to be observationally equivalent, i.e. Markov com-
patible with the same set of joint probability distributions [13]. Two ob-
servationally equivalent DAGs cannot be distinguished without performing
interventions or drawing on additional causal information. For example
[10], in a causal diagram modeling relationships between the season, rain,
sprinkler settings and whether the ground is wet, it would be reasonable
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X Y
Z
x Y
Z
(a) (b)
Figure 2: An intervention do(X = x) on causal model M produces submodel
Mx
to accept a model where the season causally effects the sprinkler settings,
but not vise-versa. While indistinguishable from observation alone, the two
models imply different results due to intervention; it would be implausible
that changing the settings on a sprinkler would cause the season of the year
to change as a result.
Season
Sprinkler
Rain
Wet
Slippery
(a)
Season
Sprinkler
Rain
Wet
Slippery
(b)
Figure 3: Observationally equivalent DAGs
Identification of causal effect
The problem of whether a causal query can be uniquely answered is referred
to as causal identifiability. An unbiased estimate of P (y | xˆi) can always be
calculated from observational (preintervention) probabilities in Markovian
models by conditioning on the parents ofXi and averaging the result, weighted
by the probabilities of PAi = pai. This operation is called “adjusting for
PAi” or “adjustment for direct causes” [10]. More formally, the observational
probability distribution P and causal diagram G of a Markovian model
identifies the effect of the intervention do(Xi = xi) on Y and is given by:
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P (y | xˆi) =
∑
pai
P (y | xi, pai)P (pai)
Semi-Markovian models do not always permit identification. A simple
example is when a single latent variable is a parent of every observable
variable. Informally, it is not possible to determine if observed covariation is
indicative of a causal effect between two variables, or whether their common,
unobservable parent brings about the correlation. For example [15], consider
two models, M1 and M2 where both models have observable variables X,Y ,
latent Z ∼ Bernoulli(0.5), and fX(z) = z. In M1, fY (z, x) = z XOR x;
in M2, fY (z, x) = 0. These models are compatible with the same causal
diagrams and have identical observational probability distributions, but
different causal effects, P (y | xˆ). Since the causal effect cannot be uniquely
calculated from the available information, it is not identifiable. However,
many semi-Markovian models still permit estimation of certain causal effects.
Complete methods are described in [15].
The causation coefficient
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, ρ, is a standard measure
of correlation between random variables. This is commonly described as a
measure of how well the relationship between X and Y can modeled by a
linear relationship with ρ = −1/+ 1 being a perfect negative/positive linear
relationship and 0 representing no linear relationship at all. The population
correlation coefficient is defined as a normalized covariance [2]:
ρX,Y =
cov(X,Y )√
V ar[X]V ar[Y ]
= E[XY ]− E[X]E[Y ]√
(E[X2]− E[X]2)(E[Y 2]− E[Y ]2)
For discrete random variables, this is a function of the joint probability mass
function (for continuous random variables that admit a probability density
function, the summations are replaced with integrals):
ρX,Y =
∑
x
∑
y xyP (x, y)−
∑
x xP (x)
∑
y yP (y)√
(∑x x2P (x)− (∑x xP (x))2)(∑y y2P (y)− (∑y yP (y))2)
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The causation coefficient relies on the observation that the correlation coeffi-
cient can, by the law of total probability, be rewritten as a function of the
conditional distribution P (y | x), and marginal distribution, P (x), instead
of in terms of the joint density:
ρX,Y =
∑
x
∑
y xyP (y | x)P (x)−
∑
x xP (x)
∑
x
∑
y yP (y | x)P (x)√
V ar[X](∑x∑y y2P (y | x)P (x)− (∑x∑y yP (y | x)P (x))2)
Syntactically, the causation coefficient, γX→Y , is defined by replacing P (y|x)
with P (y|xˆ) and P (x) with Pˆ (x). As a convenience, the following terms
are also defined: V ar[Xˆ] = ∑x x2Pˆ (x) − (∑x xPˆ (x))2 and V ar[YXˆ ] =∑
x
∑
y y
2P (y|xˆ)Pˆ (x)− (∑x∑y yP (y|xˆ)Pˆ (x))2. The full definition of γX→Y
is then:
γX→Y =
∑
x
∑
y xyP (y | xˆ)Pˆ (x)−
∑
x xPˆ (x)
∑
x
∑
y yP (y | xˆ)Pˆ (x)√
V ar[Xˆ]V ar[YXˆ ]
Where P (y | xˆ) is the causal effect of do(X = x) on Y and Pˆ (x) is the
distribution of interventions.
Distribution of interventions
In the discrete case, the distribution of interventions can be thought of as
a set of weights for averaging the possible causal effects. It also has an
interpretation in the context of observational and experimental studies. As
an example, consider a scenario where patients decide for themselves whether
or not to take a drug (X), and observe whether or not they recover (Y ).
The population joint probability distribution, P (x, y), provides all of the
information available from an idealized version of this observational study.
For intuition, it may be helpful to imagine P (x, y) as being calculated from
millions of samples to the point where random sampling error has ceased to
be a relevant consideration.
This simplest way to model this is with Bernoulli (binary) random variables
for X and Y , with 0 representing no treatment or failure to recover and 1
representing treatment or recovery. The probability of patients deciding for
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themselves whether or not to take the drug, in this observational study, is
the marginal probability P (x). In clinical terms, P (X = 0) and P (X = 1)
are the relative sizes of the cohorts.
However, even in an idealized observational study, P (y | x) would not
provide definitive information on whether treatment actually improves patient
outcomes. Hypothetically, the drug could cause unpleasant side effects in
the patients that would have received the greatest benefit, leading those
patients to choose not to take the drug. An idealized randomized controlled
trial would permit an analyst to directly measure P (y | xˆ), as randomization
explicitly cuts out confounding. However, randomized controlled trials are
often impractical (e.g. too expensive or unethical) to run in practice.
The relative sizes of the cohorts in an observational study may be different
than the relative sizes of the treatment and control groups in a corresponding
randomized controlled trial – this is the use of the distribution of interventions
Pˆ . Experiments are often designed to have equal group sizes as this typically
provides maximum statistical power, but this is by no means universal. Also,
it is not uncommon for patients to drop out or otherwise be disqualified from
studies, so the cohorts will often be unequal in practice.
The natural causation coefficient, denoted γX→Y or γ, is defined for Pˆ (x)
equal to the pre-intervention marginal distribution, P (x). This corresponds to
an experimental trial where the treatment groups are scaled to be proportional
to the relative sizes seen in the observational study.
The maximum entropy causation coefficient, denoted γH,X→Y or γH , is
the causation coefficient where Pˆ (x) is a maximum entropy probability
distribution. For random variables with bounded support, this is the uniform
distribution and corresponds to equal treatment group sizes.
Other distributions of interventions are possible, to reweigh the effects of
certain interventions relative to others in the computation of the causation
coefficient. These should be denoted explicitly as γPˆ . For example, a
certain drug may be known to be helpful in certain small doses, but worse
than no treatment at all in larger doses, in which case both the natural
and maximum entropy coefficients could be misleading. In such cases, a
distribution of interventions corresponding to current best practices may be
more informative.
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Independence and invariance
The definition of independence of random variables X and Y is:
∀x, y P (x, y) = P (x)P (y) or, equivalently: ∀x, y P (y | x) = P (y). In other
words, observing X provides no information about Y (and vise-versa). The
causal equivalent is invariance of Y to X: ∀x, y P (y | xˆ) = P (y); that is to
say, no possible intervention on X can affect Y [18]. Unlike independence,
invariance is not symmetric. The term mutually invariant is suggested to
refer to when both Y is invariant to X and X is invariant to Y .
For Bernoulli random variables, X and Y are uncorrelated (ρ = 0) if and only
if they are independent. The analogous condition holds for the causation
coefficient. For Bernoulli distributed X and Y , γX→Y = 0 if and only if Y
is invariant to X (see appendix for proof). However, both the correlation
and causation coefficients have difficulty capturing nonlinear relationships
between variables.6 In general, independence implies ρ = 0 and invariance
implies γ = 0, but the converse does not hold for many distributions.
Table 1: Non-invariant interventional distributions where
γH = 0
P (y | xˆ) y=0 y=1
x=-1 1/3 2/3
x=0 2/3 1/3
x=1 1/3 2/3
As a simple example, Table 1 contains interventional distributions where Y
is not invariant to X, but the maximum entropy causation coefficient γH = 0.
The natural causation coefficient may be positive, negative or zero depending
on the observational (pre-intervention) distribution P (x).
Average treatment effect
Average treatment effect is defined as [19]:
ATE(X → Y ) = P (Y = 1 | do(X = 1))− P (Y = 1 | do(X = 0))
6Also worth noting is that neither coefficient is robust to outliers. This can be mitigated
by winsorizing or trimming.
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This is the probabilistic causal model equivalent of the Rubin causal model
definition of average treatment effect. Positive ATE implies that treatment
is, on average, superior to non-treatment, while negative ATE implies the
opposite. For Bernoulli distributed X and Y , γX→Y reduces to (see appendix
for proof):
γX→Y = ATE(X → Y )
√√√√ V ar[Xˆ]
V arXˆ [Y ]
Since variance is strictly positive for nondegenerate Bernoulli distributions,
this implies that γ has the same sign as the average treatment effect.
A taxonomy of correlation/causation relationships
For Bernoulli X and Y , ρ and γ provide a natural way to classify the
possible correlation/causation relationships. ρ and γ can each be positive,
negative or zero, implying 9 possible relationships. These are grouped into 5
classifications in Table 2.
Table 2: Correlation/causation relationships
ρ γ
independent and invariant 0 0
common causation +/- 0
inverse causation +/- -/+
unfaithful 0 +/-
genuine causation +/- +/-
In Table 2, “0” is a zero value for the coefficient, and “+/-” refers to the
coefficient taking on a positive or a negative value (e.g. inverse causation
refers to either a model with positive ρ and negative γ, or negative ρ and
positive γ). Note that ρ and γ are population coefficients; this taxonomy can
be thought of as categorizing the possible relationships between correlation
and causation, in the limit of infinite samples.
Many of the relationships described in the following sections are well known
and existing terminology is used where appropriate. Examples of each re-
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lationship are given, as well as simple probabilistic causal models of three
Bernoulli distributed variables that produce the described relationship. No-
tably absent is the notion of mutual causation, which is beyond the scope
of this paper. Note that while ρ is symmetric, i.e. ρX,Y = ρY,X , at least
one of γX→Y , γY→X is zero in all recursive probabilistic causal models (see
appendix for proof).
Independent and invariant
Two variables that are independent and mutually invariant are completely
unrelated – neither observing nor manipulating one can provide information
about or change the other. This is usually the default assumption when
studying a system – in hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis is usually “no
effect”. For a somewhat absurd example, researchers would not believe that
the average gas mileage of a Prius is related in any way to the minimum
width of the English channel [20] by default – some sort of evidence would
be expected before taking such a suggestion seriously. The notion of light
cones provides an example familiar to physicists – the principle of locality
and the theory special relativity imply that nothing outside of someone’s
past and future light cones can ever affect them.
Independent and invariant variables can be trivially mathematically modeled.
An example is provided here to introduce the conventions used throughout
the rest of this section. Let X , Y , Z be fair coins, i.e. independent Bernoulli
distributed random variables with p = 0.5. These are the exogenous variables
of the probabilistic causal model. X will generally model a cause or treatment,
Y , an effect or response, and Z, a confounding variable that causally effects
X and Y . An example model with independent and invariant X and Y is
simply:
Z = Z
X = X
Y = Y
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Table 3: Observational distribution of independent and invari-
ant model
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 1/4 1/4 1/2
x=1 1/4 1/4 1/2
P (y) 1/2 1/2
Table 4: Interventional distributions of independent and in-
variant model
P (y | xˆ) y=0 y=1
x=0 1/2 1/2
x=1 1/2 1/2
X and Y are clearly independent and invariant and the correlation and
causal coefficients are 0.
Common causation
Reichenbach appears to be the first to propose the “Principle of the Common
Cause” claiming, “If an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must
exist a common cause” [21]. Elaborating on this, he suggests that correlation
between events A and B indicates either that A causes B, B causes A or A
and B have a common cause. This philosophical claim naturally suggests
the following definition:
Common Causation X and Y are said to experience common causation
when X and Y are mutually invariant but not independent.
This effect is sometimes referred to as a “spurious relationship” or “spurious
correlation” – a term originally coined by Pearson [22]. This risks conflating
several distinct concepts: the interventional distributions from which γ
is calculated, the population observational distribution from which ρ is
calculated, and the finite-sample observational distribution, from which
the sample correlation coefficient, r is calculated. Consider the following
scenarios:
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• A very large number of samples are taken from invariant X and Y , but
due to a latent confounding variable, X and Y are correlated.
• A small number of samples are taken from independent and invariant
X and Y , but due to random sampling errors, the sample correlation
coefficient suggests that X and Y are correlated.
In both scenarios, there is a spurious relationship between X and Y . The
first scenario exhibits common causation. The second scenario is due to
random sampling error and, as the number of samples increases, the observed
correlation will tend to zero. The term “coincidental correlation” is suggested
to distinguish this finite-sample effect from common causation.
An example of a common cause can be found in a study on myopia and
ambient lighting at night [23]. Development of myopia (shortsightedness) is
correlated with nighttime light exposure in children, although the latter does
not cause the former. The common cause is that myopic parents are likely
to have myopic children, and also more likely to set up night lights.
The following is a simple common causation model: Let X , Y , Z be fair
coins and X, Y and Z be defined by the following three equations:
Z = Z
X = Z ∧ X
Y = Z ∧ Y
Table 5: Observational distribution of common cause model
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 5/8 1/8 3/4
x=1 1/8 1/8 1/4
P (y) 3/4 1/4
Table 6: Interventional distributions of common cause model
P (y | xˆ) y=0 y=1
x=0 3/4 1/4
x=1 3/4 1/4
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From the observational distribution, it is clear that X and Y are correlated
(ρ = 1/3) and from the interventional distributions, that X and Y are
invariant (γ = 0).
Inverse causation
A classic veridical paradox is the relationship between tuberculosis and dry
climate [24]. At one point, Arizona, with one of the driest climates in the
United States was found to also have the largest share of tuberculosis deaths.
This is because tuberculosis patients greatly benefit from a dry climate, and
many moved there. The following is proposed as a definition for this type of
scenario:
Inverse causation X and Y are said to experience inverse causation when
the correlation coefficient ρ and causation coefficient γ have the opposite
sign.
Inverse causation is of special importance when considering clinical treatment;
a case of inverse causation is a case where the correct treatment option is
the opposite of what a naive interpretation of correlation would suggest.
The following is a simple model that exhibits inverse causation: Let Z be a
fair coin, and Y be Bernoulli distributed with p = 3/4. The following is an
inverse causation model with ρ = −1/2 and γ = 1/4:
Z = Z
X = Z
Y =
{
¬Z if Y = 1
X if Y = 0
Table 7: Observational distribution of inverse causation model
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 1/8 3/8 1/2
x=1 3/8 1/8 1/2
P (y) 1/2 1/2
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Table 8: Interventional distributions of inverse causation
model
P (y | xˆ) y=0 y=1
x=0 5/8 3/8
x=1 3/8 5/8
“Inverse causation” suggested to avoid confusion with other terminology.
“Anti-causation” is inappropriate, as “anti-causal filters” in digital signal
processing are filters whose output depend on future inputs. “Reverse
causation” is also inappropriate, as this refers to mistakenly believing that
Y has a causal effect on X, when, X causes Y .
Unfaithfulness
The Markov condition entails a set of conditional independence relations be-
tween variables corresponding to nodes in a DAG. The faithfulness condition
[spirtes2000] (also referred to as stability [10]) is the converse.
Faithfulness condition A distribution P is faithful to a DAG G if no
conditional independence relations other than the ones entailed by the
Markov condition are present.
This is a global condition, applying to a joint probability distribution and
a DAG. The following local condition is defined in terms of two random
variables X and Y in a causal model:
Unfaithful X and Y are said to be unfaithful if they are independent but
not mutually invariant.
This local condition can only occur if the global faithfulness condition is
violated (see appendix for proof). For Bernoulli random variables, X and Y
are unfaithful if and only if ρ = 0 and γ 6= 0.
The following model is a simple example where X and Y are unfaithful. Let
Z , Y be fair coins. Then, in the following model, ρ = 0 and γ = 1/2:
Z = Z
X = Z
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Y =
{
¬Z, if Y = 1
X, if Y = 0
Table 9: Observational distribution of unfaithful model
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 1/4 1/4 1/2
x=1 1/4 1/4 1/2
P (y) 1/2 1/2
Table 10: Interventional distributions of unfaithful model
P (y | xˆ) y=0 y=1
x=0 3/4 1/4
x=1 1/4 3/4
Almost all models are faithful in a formal sense – models that do not respect
the faithfulness condition have Lebeguse measure zero in probability spaces
where model parameters have continuous support and are independently
distributed [25]. However, this does not mean that such models can be
dismissed out of hand; they are vanishingly unlikely to occur by chance, but
can be deliberately engineered.
Friedman’s thermostat and the traitorous lieutenant
Consider “Friedman’s Thermostat”; a correctly functioning thermostat would
keep the indoor temperature constant, regardless of the external tempera-
ture, by adjusting the furnace settings.7 Observation would show external
temperature and furnace settings to be anticorrelated with each other and
internal temperature to be uncorrelated with both. This does not correspond
to the true causal effect that external temperature and furnace settings have
on internal temperature.
7Friedman introduced the thermostat analogy in the context of a central bank controlling
money supply [26]. Its use as a general analogy for correlation and causation has been
popularized by Rowe [27].
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The sharp-eyed reader will note that the Friedman’s thermostat example is
not a recursive (acyclic) causal model. An example of unfaithfulness with a
recursive causal model can be seen in the following “Traitorous Lieutenant”
problem. Consider the problem of a general trying to send a one-bit message.
The general has two lieutenants available to act as messengers, however, one
of them is a traitor and will leak whatever information they have to the
enemy. The general observes the following protocol: to send a 1, the general
either gives the first lieutenant a 1 and the other a 0, or the first a 0 and the
second a 1, with equal probability. To send a 0, the general either gives both
lieutenants a 0, or both lieutenants a 1, with equal probability. The recipient
of the message XORs both lieutenants’ bits to recover the original message.
General
Recipient
Lieutenant
(loyal)
Lieutenant
(traitor)
Figure 4: Diagram of the traitorous lieutenant problem
In this scenario, the traitor will see a 0 and 1 with equal probability, regardless
of the actual message. This is unfaithfulness; a lieutenant changing their bit
has a causal effect on the final message, but observing a single lieutenant’s
bit provides no information.
Genuine causation and confounding bias
“Genuine causation” is suggested for referring to models where ρ and γ have
the same sign. However, due to confounding bias, the strength of the true
casual effect may be different than what a naive interpretation of correlation
would suggest.
The causal definition of no confounding is provided by Pearl [28].
No confounding Let M be a causal model. X and Y are not confounded
in M if and only if P (y | xˆ) = P (y | x).
By the definition of the causation coefficient, no confounding implies ρ = γ.
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Genuine causation with negative confounding bias corresponds to γ > ρ,
and can be thought of as a weaker version of the type of confounding effect
that produces unfaithfulness or inverse causation. In such cases, the true
causal effect will be stronger than correlation suggests. Let Z be a fair coin
and Y be Bernoulli distributed with p = 1/4. Then, the following model
exhibits genuine causation with negative confounding bias, with ρ = 1/2 and
γ = 3/4:
Z = Z
X = Z
Y =
{
¬Z, if Y = 1
X, if Y = 0
Table 11: Observational distribution of negative confounding
bias model
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 3/8 1/8 1/2
x=1 1/8 3/8 1/2
P (y) 1/2 1/2
Table 12: Interventional distributions of negative confounding
bias model
P (y | xˆ) y=0 y=1
x=0 7/8 1/8
x=1 1/8 7/8
Genuine causation with positive confounding bias corresponds to γ < ρ; in
such cases, the true causal effect will be weaker than correlation suggests.
Let X , Y , Z be fair coins. In the following model, ρ ≈ 0.745, the natu-
ral causation coefficient, γ ≈ 0.447, and the maximum entropy causation
coefficient, γH = 0.5:
Z = Z
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X = Z ∧ X
Y =
{
Z, if Y = 1
X, if Y = 0
Table 13: Observational distribution of positive confounding
bias model
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 5/8 1/8 3/4
x=1 0 1/4 1/4
P (y) 5/8 3/8
Table 14: Interventional distributions of positive confounding
bias model
P (y | xˆ) y=0 y=1
x=0 3/4 1/4
x=1 1/4 3/4
Typical relationship between correlation and cau-
sation
Common intuition suggests that correlation is closely related to causation.
However, the models in the previous section act as a constructive proof
that the sign of the correlation coefficient provides no guarantees about
the true causal effect. Some insight on this apparent discrepancy can be
found by considering the following set of linear probabilistic causal models,
parameterized by σ2X , σ
2
Y
, σ2Z , αZ , βX , βZ :
Z = Z
X = αZZ + X
Y = βXX + βZZ + Y
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Since these models are linear and covariance is bilinear, the population corre-
lation coefficient can be calculated analytically, regardless of the underlying
distribution of the error terms:
ρX,Y =
βXσ
2
X
+ (α2ZβX + αZβZ)σ2Z√
(σ2X + α
2
Zσ
2
Z
)(β2Xσ2X + σ2Y + (αZβX + βZ)2σ2Z )
The natural causation coefficient can also be calculated directly from the
definitions of the causation coefficient and causal effect:
γX→Y =
βXσ
2
X
+ α2ZβXσ2Z√
(σ2X + α
2
Zσ
2
X
)(β2Xσ2X + σ2Y + (α
2
Zβ
2
X + β2Z)σ2Z )
The typical relationship between correlation and causation can be analyzed
by constructing a probability distribution for the parameters of the linear
model. αZ , βX , βZ have support over the entire real line; σ2X , σ
2
Y
, σ2Z have
support over (0,∞). Given mean 0 and variance 1, the maximum entropy
distributions are N(0, 1) and exp(1), respectively. Assuming jointly inde-
pendent distributions over the parameters, it is straightforward to randomly
sample models and compute their correlation and causation coefficients.
Plotting γ against ρ yields a graph where each point represents a single linear
probabilistic causal model. The (smoothed) result of plotting such a graph
is in Figure 5.
In the graph of γ vs ρ, the upper left and lower right quadrants contain inverse
causation models and the other two quadrants contain genuine causation
models. Except for (0, 0), which corresponds to an invariant and independent
model, the horizontal line, ρ = 0, contains common causation models and
the vertical line, γ = 0, contains unfaithful models.
With maximum entropy distributions over the parameters, the probability
of a random linear model exhibiting inverse causation ≈ 0.122, genuine
causation with negative bias ≈ 0.364, and genuine causation with positive
bias ≈ 0.514. This matches closely with common intuition. Typically, a
strong positive correlation indicates a strong positive causal effect – this can
be seen in the upper right quadrant, with a high density of models. Inverse
causation is possible, although much less likely, and unfaithful models have
measure 0, which accounts for why they are often considered counterintuitive.
However, this is an analysis of population, not sample coefficients and the
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Figure 5: Causation vs correlation coefficient (kernel density estimation with
106 samples). Darker shading indicates higher density of models. The curves
at the top and right of the graph are the marginal densities of ρ and γ.
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measure of nearly unfaithful models is nonzero.8 In practice, this means that
unfaithfulness cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. Although the population
correlation will be zero in such models, the sample correlation will often
be indistinguishable from zero, despite the possibility of a nontrivial causal
effect.
The choice of a maximum entropy distribution in this analysis is based on
the principle of maximum entropy, which states that the appropriate prior
distribution, given the absence of any other information, is the maximum
entropy distribution [30]. However, the choice of linear models and the
particular parameterization remain somewhat subjective. The statement
that inverse causation only occurs in ≈ 12% of models should be seen as
qualitatively consistent with the intuition that such situations are rare, but
not quantitatively significant.
Estimating the causal coefficient
Randomization of an independent variable effectively cuts all incoming edges
to that node in a causal diagram, removing potential confounding effects.
Reporting a correlation coefficient, in the context of a randomized controlled
trial, can be viewed as reporting an estimate of the causation coefficient,
with the distribution of interventions, Pˆ (x), equal to the distribution of
interventions that were performed in the experiment.
When randomization is not available, it may still be possible calculate a
sample causal coefficient by estimating P (y | do(x)). Presented here is a
simple example, using data from a study on the treatment of kidney stones
[31]. More advanced techniques for identifying P (y | do(x)) are given in [15].
The subgroups (Z) in Table 15 refer to kidney stone size. Group 1 is small
kidney stones; group 2 is large kidney stones. This study can be modeled
with binary treatment (X) and response (Y ) variables, with the decision to
perform percutaneous nephrolithotomy (PCNL) as 0 and surgery as 1.
8Formally, the measure of λ-strong-unfaithful distributions converges to 1 exponentially
in the number of nodes [29].
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Table 15: Success rate of treatment; successful/total (proba-
bility)
Group 1 Group 2 Overall
Open surgery 81/87 (0.93) 192/263 (0.73) 273/350 (0.78)
PCNL 234/270 (0.87) 55/80 (0.69) 289/350 (0.83)
Overall 315/357 (0.88) 247/343 (0.72) 562/700 (0.80)
The naive model is that there is no confounding (Figure 6a). In such a case,
the population natural causation coefficient equals the population correlation
coefficient and therefore the sample correlation coefficient r is equal to the
sample causation coefficient g.9 Given the data, r = g = −0.057. The
cohorts are equal in size, so this is also an estimate of the maximum entropy
causation coefficient.
X Y
Z
(a)
X Y
Z
(b)
X Y
Z
(c)
Figure 6: Some of the possible causal diagrams for modeling kidney stone
treatment
Hypothetically, if the subgroups were postoperative infection and the treat-
ment affected the likelihood of postoperative infection, which, in turn, affected
recovery (Figure 6b), the natural causation coefficient would still equal the
correlation coefficient – adjusting for subgroups would still be incorrect. This
is an immediate consequence of the do-calculus [15].
However, the correct set of causal assumptions is that kidney stone size affects
treatment and recovery (Figure 6c) – doctors took kidney stone size into
account when making the decision whether or not to send a patient to surgery.
Correctly estimating the causation coefficient in this model can be done with
an adjustment for direct causes, P (y | do(x)) = ∑z P (y | x, z)P (z). With
9Statisticians normally denote an estimate of a parameter, θ, with a hat symbol, θˆ.
This convention is not followed here, since the hat symbol has been used to indicate causal
effect.
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respect to the correct causal diagram, estimating the causation coefficient
yields g = 0.068. This a case of inverse causation and the best treatment
option for patients is the opposite of what a naive interpretation of correlation
would suggest.
The reversal effect seen here is well known as Simpson’s paradox, but requires
causal knowledge to resolve correctly [32]. Adjusting for the wrong variables
will produce incorrect estimates of causal effect.
Conclusions
There are many different ways in which positive correlation can be misleading
with respect to causation. Population distributions may exhibit common
causation (ρ > 0, γ = 0) or inverse causation (ρ > 0, γ < 0). Sampling
error introduces the possibility of coincidental correlation (r > 0, ρ = 0).
Unfaithfulness (ρ = 0, γ 6= 0) implies that the absence of correlation cannot
guarantee the absence of causation. And even if there is no confounding
(ρ = γ), human error introduces the possibility of reverse causation (γX→Y 6=
γY→X).
Despite the warning that, “Correlation is not causation”, the two are easy
to conflate because of the high likelihood that a random model will have
ρ ≈ γ. However, there remains a nontrivial possibility of encountering other
correlation/causation relationships such as inverse causation, a problem that
no amount of additional data sampling will mitigate. There is simply no
substitute for accurate causal assumptions.
By emphasizing the population/sample and statistical/causal distinctions
and explicitly naming the different ways in which correlation can relate to
causation, it is hoped that these effects will become easier to recognize in
practice.
Appendix
Theorem. For Bernoulli X, Y , γX→Y = 0 if and only if Y is invariant to
X.
Proof. Consider the definition of average treatment effect, ATE(X → Y ) =
P (y = 1 | do(x = 1)) − P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)). Average treatment effect is
27
zero if and only if P (y = 1 | do(x = 1)) = P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)). Since
the support of a Bernoulli random variable is {0, 1}, this is equivalent to Y
invariant to X. Since γ has the same sign as the average treatment effect,
γX→Y = 0 if and only if Y is invariant to X. 
Theorem. For BernoulliX, Y : γX→Y = ATE(X → Y )(V ar[Xˆ]/V arXˆ [Y ])1/2
Proof. Consider the numerator of γ. For Bernoulli random variables:
P (y | do(x = 1))Pˆ (x = 1)− Pˆ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))Pˆ (x = 1)
+ P (y = 1 | do(x = 0))Pˆ (x = 0))
= Pˆ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− Pˆ (x = 1)P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))
− Pˆ (x = 0)P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)))
= Pˆ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− Pˆ (x = 1)P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))
− (1− Pˆ (x = 1))P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)))
= Pˆ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− P (y = 1 | do(x = 0))
− Pˆ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− P (y = 1 | do(x = 0))))
=(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)))Pˆ (x = 1)(1− Pˆ (x = 1))
=ATE(X → Y )V ar[Xˆ]
Therefore, γX→Y = ATE(X → Y )(V ar[Xˆ]/V arXˆ [Y ])1/2. 
Theorem. In all recursive probabilistic causal models, at least one of
γX→Y , γY→X is zero.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that γx→y is nonzero. This
implies that Y is not invariant to X. Since P (y | xˆ) is a nonconstant function
of x, X must be an ancestor of Y in the associated causal diagram. Consider
the submodel My that results from do(Y = y). Since, X is an ancestor of Y
in the original model, X and Y must be d-separated in My. Therefore, X is
invariant to Y and γY→X is zero. 
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Theorem. If X and Y are unfaithful in causal model M , then the
observational distribution P and causal diagram G associated withM violate
the faithfulness condition.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that Y is not invariant to X.
Therefore, X is an ancestor of Y in the associated causal diagram and X and
Y are d-connected [10]. However, X and Y are independent, an independence
relation not entailed by the Markov condition. Therefore the observational
distribution P is not faithful to G. 
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